## **ATT&CK Community Workshop**

# Purple Teaming with Attack Flow

#### **Denise Tan**

# Overview

- 1. Visualizing results in a heatmap
- 2. Different approach to interpreting results
- 3. Utilizing Attack Flow for Purple Teaming
- 4. Key takeaways from Attack Flow
- 5. Attack Flow Builder

#### results .



Profile of Fictional Company

"QuestLab Inc."



#### Research Institute with <20 employees

#### <u>Security stack</u> Microsoft 365 Business Premium


- EDR: Defender for Business
- Firewall: Windows Defender Firewall



Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion		Credential Access	Discovery		Lateral Movement	Collection		Command and Control	Exfitration
Content	Command and	Account	Abuse Elevation Control	Abuse Elevation Control		lentia)s	Account	· ·	oitation	Archive		plication	Automated
Injection	Scripting Interpreter	Manipulation	Mechanism	Mechanism	Store	Password	Discovery	Serv	emote	Collected Data	Lay Prot	tocol	Exfiltration
Drive-by	Exploitation	Boot or Logon	Access Token	Access Token	Mod	ify	File and	Inter	nal	Data from			Data
Compromise	for Client Execution	Autostart	Manipulation	Manipulation	Auth Proc	entication tess	Directory Discovery	Spea	arphishing	Configuration Repository		DNS	Transfer Size Limits
Exploit	Inter-Process	Event	Account	Domain	os		Permission	Late	ra	Data from	1	File	Exfiltration Over
Public-Facing Application	Communication	Triggered Execution	Manipulation	Policy Modification	Cred Dum	fential	Groups Discovery	Tool Tran		Information Repositories		Transfer Protocols	Alternative
Hardware	Native	Hijack	Boot or Logon Autostart	Execution		/etc/passwd and	Software	<u> </u>	note Service	Data	1	Mail	Exfiltration
Additions	API	Flow	Execution	Guardrails		/etc/shadow	Discovery	Hijac		Staged		Protocols	C2 Channel
Phishing	Scheduled	Modify Authentication	Domain Pollicy	File and Directory		Cached Domain	System Information	Rem	note	Email		Web	Exfiltration Over Other
	Task/Job	Process	Modification	Permissions Modification		Credentials	Discovery	Serv	rices	Collection		Protocojs	Network Medium
Spearphishing	Shared	Scheduled	Escape	Hide			System		lication			mmunication ough	Exfiltration
Attachment	Modules	Task/Job	to Host	Artifacts		DCSync	Location Discovery	Thro Rem	novable Media			movable Media	Over Physical Medium
Spearphishing	System		Event	ivent Hijack	LSA	System Network	Taint	t		Cor	ntent	Exfiltration	
Link	Services	At	Triggered	Execution		Secrets	Configuration Discovery	Shar Conf			Inje	ection	Over Web Service
Spearphishing	User	Container	Exploitation	Impair		LSASS	System Network	Use	Alternate		Dat	a	Scheduled
via Service	Execution	Orchestration	for Privilogo Escalation	Defenses		Memory	Connections	Auth Mate	entication		Enc	coding	Transfer
Spearphishing	Malicicus		Hljack	Indicator			System		Application		Dat	la	Transfer
Voice	File	Cron	Execution Flow	Removal		NTDS	Owner/User Discovery		Access Token			fuscation	Data to Cloud Account
Replication	Malicious	Scheduled	Process			Proc	System		Pass		Dyn	namic	
Through Removable Media	Image	Task	Injection	Masquerading		Filesystem	Service Discovery		the Hash		Res	solution	

#### Note:


- Highlighted techniques are based on APT29's campaigns
- Heatmap generated via MITRE ATT&CK Navigator




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ery	<u>Lateral</u> <u>Movement</u>	<u>Command &amp;</u> <u>Control</u>	<u>Exfiltration</u>
nd ory ery	Pass the Hash	Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
are ery			
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Initial Access	<b>Execution</b>	<u>Persistence</u>	Privilege Escalation	<u>Credential</u> <u>Access</u>	<u>Discovery</u>	<u>Lateral</u> <u>Movement</u>	<u>Command &amp;</u> <u>Control</u>	<b>Exfiltration</b>
Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment	User Execution: Malicious File	Scheduled Task/Job	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory	File and Directory Discovery	Pass the Hash	Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
09	5				Software Discovery			
					System Information Discovery			



ery	<u>Lateral</u> <u>Movement</u>	<u>Command &amp;</u> <u>Control</u>	<u>Exfiltration</u>
nd ory ery	Pass the Hash	Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
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


Other limitations:


Views techniques in an atomic manner

Lacks context - dependencies exist between each technique

ery	<u>Lateral</u> <u>Movement</u>	<u>Command &amp;</u> <u>Control</u>	<u>Exfiltration</u>
nd ory ery	Pass the Hash	Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
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
Lacks context - dependencies exist between each technique



### What is Attack Flow?



Accurate reflection of security posture



Sequences of adversary behavior




TTPs in the context of adversary campaigns







































## **Attack Flow**



### **Pre-Exercise: Attack Flow**




### Start of Campaign





			Discovery		
Initial Access T1566.00 Plishing Spearphishing Attachment Phishing Spearphishing email containing analicous attachment (Word document)	Execution 1204 002 User Execution Malicious File Victim opened the malicious Word document and enabled macros	Command and Control T07.00 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols Use HTTP(S) listeners to communicate with C2 server	TIDB Software Discovery Enumerate software installed on compromised machine Tide 3 File and Directory Discovery Lust files and directories '' dir' Tide System Information Discovery Enumerate system information of compromised machine '' systeminfo'	Persistence TIO5 JOS Scheduled Task/Job Scheduled Task Gain persistence via scheduled task creation	Exfiltratio Total Extiltration over C2 Extiltrate data via C2 chan Privilege Esco Explotation for Privileg
					Current privilege






### Start of Campaign








### Middle of Campaign




## End of Campaign






### **Iterative Cycle**






#### **Post-Exercise: Defensive Controls**





#### <u>Legend</u>

Green: TTP with defensive control Red: TTP without defensive control Dotted rectangle: Defensive control

### Defensive Controls: Start of Campaign








T1071.001


Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

Use HTTP(S) listeners to communicate with C2 server


#### Defense-in-depth



### Key Takeaways from Attack Flow




### Key Takeaways from Attack Flow



Instead of trying to implement defensive measures for every technique...

• Focus on techniques at the start of the flow


### Key Takeaways from Attack Flow



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
- Focus on techniques at the start of the flow
- Address chokepoints in the flow


#### MITRE CTID's Attack Flow Builder



Access Attack Flow Builder at: https://center-for-threat-informed-defense.github.io/attack-flow/ui/


### More Examples of Attack Flows






- Attack Flows from MITRE CTID's corpus
- Access them at: https://center-for-threat-informed-defense.github.io/attack-flow/example\_flows/





#### Conclusion



### -Attack Flow





# Thank you

